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Abstract 
Bold claims are made about contemporary political theory's accomplishments since that 
theory was inagurated by the writings of Arrow, Downs, Black, Riker, Buchanan and 
Tullock, and Olson. Others argue, however, that this theory suffers from too great a con­
cern with mathematical notation and too little concern with substantive relevance. This 
essay argues that both views are essentially correct - that although our understanding 
of politics (and of economics) remains in such a primitive state. that we cannot ignore
the practical necessity for considering other, less formal modes of inquiry, something has 
been accomplished. In particular, we argue that the current paths of development of 
political theory - the discovery of First Principles - are identical to those set forth by 
arguably the most successful set of "political engineers" in history - the founders of the 
American republic. However, we also argue that many of the shortcomings of contem­
porary theory derive from a failure to appreciate something that was apparent to those 
Founders; namely, the distinction between science and engineering and the proper role 
of empirical and experimental analysis. 
* Prepared for delivery at the Eighth International Sy mposium in Economic Theory and
Econometrics, Washington University, St. Louis, May 22-25, 1991. 
The Development of Contemporary Political Theory 
In his notes on the Federal Convention, James Madison (1898: 108-9) reports the following 
comments by Benjamin Franklin with respect to the manner in which judges ought to be chosen: 
Doctor Franklin observed, that the two modes of choosing Judges had been mentioned, to wit, 
by the Legislature and by the Executive. He wished such other modes to be suggested as might 
occur to other gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would mention one which he 
had understood was practised in Scotland. He then, in a brief and entertaining manner, related 
a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the lawyers. who always selected the 
ablest of the profession, in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves. 
It was here, he said, the interest of the electors to make the best choice, which would always be 
made the case if possible. 
Thus, with a particular problem in hand, Franklin identifies the components of rational self-interest 
and suggests an incentive-compatible mechanism for making the desired social choice. So the 
question that confronts us in this essay is whether, in the 200+ years since Franklin spoke, we have 
advanced the science of politics in an appreciable way. 
To render a judgment about contemporary political theory, we should return to the post-World 
War II era, because it was then that the research regarded by political scientists as path-breaking was 
not an outgrowth of economics or the rationalism of the 18th century, but rather of the "behavioral 
revolution." In response to the purely institutional descriptive mode of inquiry that was previously 
dominant, this revolution sensitized us to the importance of socio-psychological variables and 
statistical methodologies, and to the relevance of public opinion and its measurement. But much of 
that research followed a path in which scholarship was judged by the size of ones's data set and by 
the novelty of the statistical tools employed, rather than by its contribution to the development of a 
coherent, parsimonious, and deductive theory of political action. Correlation piled upon correlation, 
and political scientists felt compelled to become familiar with a plethora of ill-defined ideas such as 
anomie, alienation, cognitive dissonance, and attitude, as well as innumerable concepts defined by 
ad hoc measurements rather than theoretical constructs. 
Of course, behavioralism was not the only contender for the political scientist's sole. But 
paralleling events of an earlier time in which the radical empiricism of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries gave way to the rationalism of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau in the eighteenth century, a 
series of books inaugurated a second revolution in the study of politics at approximately the same time 
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as behavioralism's ascendancy -- a revolution that would draw our attention back to the institutional 
details of political activity, that would sharpen the distinction between normative and descriptive 
analysis, and that would reinvigorate the development of a deductive theory of political processes. 
The centerpieces of that revolution are Arrow's (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values, Black's 
(1958) Theory of Committees and Elections, Riker's (1962) Theory of Political Coalitions, Downs' An 
Economic Theory of Democracy, Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) Calculus of Consent, and Olson's 
(1965) Logic of Collective Action. These volumes brought order to political analysis and set the 
direction for future research so that it could begin to uncover first principles of political action in 
such areas as social choice theory, voting in committees, coalition formation, majority rule elections, 
and interest group action. 
Three other books also contributed importantly to this second revolution: Luce and Raiffa's ( 1957) 
Games and Decisions, Farguharson's (1969) Theory of Voting, and Key's (1966) The Responsible 
Electorate. Although von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1945) The Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior is the seminal volume of game theory, Luce and Raiffa's interpretative survey trained a 
generation of scholars to think in game-theoretic (strategic) terms. Through their effort, ideas such 
as Nash equilibria, strategy, extensive, normal, and characteristic function form, the core and V-sets 
became familiar to those who saw themselves as replacing pure empiricism with formal, deductive 
thinking. And today, game theory is the primary theoretical structure that anchors and integrates the 
most recent developments in political theory. 
Farquharson makes no direct mention of game theory, but he offered the "radical" idea that voting 
procedures are strategic environments and that the outcomes they produce can be ascertained only by 
evaluating how voters respond to the anticipated actions of other voters, where all responses are 
mediated by the prevailing electoral institution. Farquharson, then, anticipated not only the 
development of ideas such as subgame perfection, and the necessity for understanding how procedural 
details can be used by those who design and implement those procedures to manipulate outcomes, he 
also anticipated the hallmark of contemporary political theory -- that all political-economic action 
takes place in contexts in which people's fates are interdependent and in which they must make 
decisions with the understanding that others about them are oftentimes acting so as to anticipate their 
actions. 
Unlike these other volumes, Key's does not offer any formal structure nor does he consider any 
game-theoretic ideas. But this last contribution by the leading scholar of American politics of his 
generation legitimized the application of rational choice models in a context, voting, that most 
researchers assumed was reserved for psycho-sociological analysis. Although few persons would 
dispute the assertion that election candidates, interest group leaders, and bureaucrats acted in their 
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individual self-interest, such an hypothesis seemed more difficult to sustain for mass political action. 
Individual perceptions were blurred, motivations unclear, and habit and socialization seemed the 
principle explanatory constructs. Key challenged such views and the subsidiary assertion that the 
rational choice paradigm was too crude a tool with which to approach the study of mass political 
behavior, and he argued that this paradigm must, of necessity, become the centerpiece of all political 
analysis. 
A series of seminal papers followed the publication of these volumes and inaugurated more 
mathematically rigorous developments. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) demonstrated that 
no democratic institution is immune from manipulation, and they thereby placed the study of strategic 
maneuver and institutions at the heart of formal political analysis; Kramer's (1972) analysis of the 
influence of parliamentary procedures established the ways in which such procedures may or may not 
induce stability in political outcomes, while simultaneously providing a set of results about voting that 
today are the foundation of models of legislative process; Plott (1966) and Davis and Hinich's ( 1966) 
extensions of Black and Downs' analyses of committees and elections offered a representation of 
political preferences that paralleled in importance the indifference curve representation of consumer 
preferences in economics, and demonstrated the fragility of stability in even the simplest of political 
processes -- 2-candidate elections and majority rule committees; building on Plott and Davis and 
Hinich's construction, McKelvey ( 1976, 1979) and Schofield (1978) demonstrated the extent of 
instability under majority rule and the opportunities to influence outcomes via manipulation of 
procedural details and they thus established the extent of the inescapable instability of voting 
processes; Schwartz (1977) clarified the intimate connection between opportunities for vote trading 
in legislatures and the Condorcet paradox and thereby answered the question as to the efficiency of 
vote trading; and, building on Farquharson's insights, innumerable papers on incentive compatibility 
and manipulability made us sensitive to the possibilities (or impossibility) of designing political­
economic institutions that realize normative ends (cf. Clarke 1971; Groves and Ledyard 1975; Maskin 
1977). 
To this list we should also append those contributions that did not offer any startling theoretical 
conclusion, but showed instead how the paradigm and its associated analytic perspectives can be 
applied to politics. We have in mind here Niskanen's (1971) analysis of bureaucracy that paralleled 
Downs' treatment of political parties and candidates, Mayhew ( 1974) and Fiorina's (1977) analyses 
of the members of the U.S. Congress in the same terms -- as goal directed utility maximiz.ers -­
Popkin's ( 1979) analysis of peasants in Viet Nam, and Schelling's (1960) seminal discussion of the 
application of game theory to the study of deception and deterrence. 
From this view, then, we have the impression of impressive advances. Our journals are replete 
with game theoretic models of elections, committees, and war and deterrence; and press editors 
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eagerly pursue half-completed manuscripts by practitioners in the field. But a more sanguine view 
argues that our understanding of politics has improved only slightly, that much of this research, like 
a giant in-grown toenail, is wholly literature-driven and directed at substantively inconsequential 
matters, and that success at finding publication outlets owes more to an intoxication with notation 
than to substantive significance. With considerable justification, people have wearied of a field that 
seems preoccupied with technical results about majority rule instability and sufficient conditions for 
the existence of Condorcet winners. They have become intolerant of research monographs that toil 
away through a seemingly endless array of notation in order to establish that a particular conjunction 
of strategies constitutes an esoteric type of equilibrium to a game that models a 3-person legislature 
or a 2-country international system. They have learned to circumvent papers whose abstracts begin 
with "we explore a model ... " or "we show that an equilibrium exists under which ... " They despair 
because, although much is known about simple forms of majority rule, very little is known about 
those rules and procedures that actually characterize political institutions. And they find insufferable 
the hubris of colleagues whose reputations are based solely on a familiarity with the latest game­
theoretic technology, and for whom empirical research consists of reading the latest issues of JET, 
the APSR, Social Choice and Welfare, the AJPS, and Econometrica. 
We should not dismiss such criticism out of hand. Contemporary political theory identifies a wide 
range of circumstances under which majority rule yields equilibrium and disequilibrium, but can we 
argue that simple majority rule characterizes anything more than a tiny proportion of political 
institutions? Countless articles have been written about the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 
but can we identify any circumstance in which identically the same game between the same people 
repeats itself even twice? We see the "new institutionalism" heralded as though it were equivalent to 
the discovery of the atom, but are these ideas new only because we have accepted a straw-man 
characterization of political science. We have witnessed the skill with which our colleagues 
manipulate equations pertaining to Bayesian beliefs and sequential equilibria, but what is the 
technology for measuring such beliefs and how do we contend with the experimental evidence that 
suggests that the Bayesian model cannot characterize subjective probability? And we have seen the 
impressive growth of models of legislative processes, but has the as if principle been stretched too 
far by special characterizations of issues and preferences and by highly restrictive assumptions about 
information and institutional structure? 
Moving into the inner recesses of the most advanced papers on political theory is oftentimes 
equally discouraging. Paper abstracts lead us to believe that advances are being made at a rapid pace, 
but the essays themselves often reveal a different story. To render matters well-defined, ad hoc 
extensive or strategic forms, which everyone is presumed to see with perfect clarity, constitute the 
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core formulation. We see legislatures consisting of one or three members, models of intergenerational 
transfers in which all of society dies after two periods, models of elections in which the victorious 
candidate is dictator over all social policy, and analyses of international affairs in which country A 
but not B can make the first threat. To render the analysis tractable and consistent with the dictates 
of contemporary game theory, common knowledge applies to things we cannot ourselves determine, 
and utility functions are separable, strictly concave, and twice differentiable. 
So what is it, then, that has been accomplished this past forty years? Is our understanding of 
politics deeper, or is it merely our understanding of our colleagues' papers, along with our ability to 
manipulate notation and string together abstract definitions, that has grown? This essay will argue 
that both views are essentially correct -- that although our understanding of politics (and of 
economics) remains in such a primitive state that we cannot ignore the practical necessity for 
considering other, less formal modes of inquiry, something has been accomplished. In particular, we 
argue that the current paths of development of political theory -- the discovery of First Principles -
- are identical to those set forth by arguably the most successful set of "political engineers" in history 
-- the Founders of the American republic. However, we also argue that many of the shortcomings 
of contemporary theory derive from a failure to appreciate something that was apparent to those 
Founders; namely, the distinction between science and engineering and the proper role of empirical 
and experimental analysis. 
I. The Spatial Election Model 
In the space of a single essay it is, of course, impossible to review critically the vast literature that 
constitutes "contemporary political theory." However, regardless of our starting point, and regardless 
of our demarkation of "important contributions," it is evident that of all the asserted accomplishments 
of that theory, none is more important than that it has led to a reintegration of politics and economics 
under a common paradigm and deductive structure. 
Both the evidence and source of this integration is generally taken to be the increasingly 
widespread acceptance of Key's argument that the rationality hypothesis has broad if not universal 
application in politics. Indeed, those scholars who critique this enterprise as either too limited in its 
application or too narrow in its normative implications focus typically on the meaning and generality 
of the assumption of self-interested action (see, for example, the essays in Monroe 1991 ). However, 
the mere acceptance of this postulate does not account for theoretical developments. Indeed, we can 
easily imagine a scenario in which its acceptance leads to little more than a reformulation of the 
behavioralist agenda, with political scientists focusing their attention on the sociological determinants 
of tastes and perceptions. 
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The second ingredient of this integration -- supplied by each of the seminal volumes in the field -
- is a concern with political institutions. If economics and politics are to be understood in the same 
terms, it is imperative that we incorporate into our research agendas the fact that these disciplines, 
if they differ at all, differ only to the extent that the study of politics and economics is little more 
than a preoccupation with the performance of different institutions. 
The focus of economics, of course, is the market and the ways in which governmental decisions 
impact on it. For political scientists, the focus is elections, legislative bodies, and, in the case of 
international politics, coordination in anarchic systems. This distinction is not sharp, as when taxation 
and trade policy are the subject of inquiry, but to be certain that we are studying matters so as to 
allow for interdisciplinary research, the institutional context of that research must be explicit. That 
is, studying the relative performance of alternative institutions of social choice and determining how 
they interact is the primary task of those who seek to develop an wholly integrated, scientifically 
correct field of political economy. 
The "Representation of Preferences: It is, however, too self-congratulatory to argue that the 
previously cited research holds a monopoly on appreciating the roles of self-interest and institutions. 
Morgenthau's (1948) text on international politics, Hoag and Hallett's (1926) study of voting 
procedures, or Bentley's (1935) analysis of interest groups should convince us that the perspectives 
of Franklin, Madison, and their contemporaries had not somehow been banished from the landscape, 
only to be resurrected in 1957 or 1962. And with respect to formalism, we should recall that sociology 
was perhaps even more mathematical than political science, and that a number of sub-fields in 
psychology were at least as sensitive to the canons scientific research. And although acceptance of 
the rationality postulate necessarily leads to game theory, merely studying alternative institutions with 
an plethora of game-theoretic formulations can only yield a dizzying selection of models in which 
synthesis is not assured. Even though game theory provides a unifying theoretical base, it alone 
cannot produce substantively meaningful integrative theory, because of necessity it remains little more 
than a set of mathematically abstract ideas (outcome sets, actions, topological trees, strategies) held 
together by ad hoc notions of equilibrium. 
In addition to abiding by the rationality paradigm, exhibiting a concern with institutions, and 
employing game theoretic tools, what was required for the development of true theory was a unifying 
representation of preferences that allows for comparisons of the relative performance of those 
institutions and the determination of how they evolve and interact. And in this respect the key 
contribution is the spatial preference structure first described by Black and Newing (1951) and 
formalized by Plott and Davis and Hinich in terms of convex preference sets and Euclidean loss 
functions. 
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To illustrate this idea's importance, consider the early research on Condorcet's paradox. Without 
applying a particular topology to outcomes and preferences, assessing the importance of that paradox 
relied on a simple counting of possibilities under empirically vacuous null assumptions of equi­
probability. On the other hand, once provided with a spatial topology, Plott, Davis and Hinich, and 
Sloss ( 1971) could convince us of the fragility of Condorcet winners and McKelvey and Schofield 
could establish the potential severity of cycles in democratic systems. Specifically, only by accepting 
the spatial representation can we see that Condorcet winners are rare and that top cycle sets can 
readily encompass the entire set of feasible outcomes. 
More generally, the spatial idea unifies the treatment of the primary actors in markets and 
elections -- consumers and voters -- in such as way that they can be viewed as the same individuals 
operating in different institutional contexts. At the heart of economic theory is the idea that if 
people's preferences over alternative states of the world satisfy only two assumptions (transitivity and 
completeness), then we can begin to describe abstractly the basic activities of barter and production. 
Moreover, if we add a few technical assumptions about preference and outcomes (e.g., continuity), 
then we can represent preferences by indifference curves and we can apply the tools of calculus and 
algebra to characterize barter and production in compact and wholly general ways that allow for the 
formulation of that most important idea in social science - the characterization of efficient markets. 
So powerful are these ideas about preference that their initial acceptance in economics largely 
accounts for the unfortunate separation of political economy into two disciplines. However, the 
spatial model allows us to formally reconnect economic and political theory. The mechanism whereby 
this "reconnection" occurs derives from the fact that spatial preferences can be derived from 
"economic preferences." Briefly, if we imagine a two-good model in which both goods are to be 
publicly provided, then Black's notion of a single peaked preference corresponds to the preference 
of an individual over a budget constraint that models a government's feasible spending policies with 
respect to those two goods. By extension, Plott and Davis and Hinich's spatial preference 
representation generalizes Black's idea to preferences over a budget simplex involving n goods or n- l 
goods plus a tax rate that determines the government's budget and the consumer-voter's ability to 
purchase other commodities in the market (c.f, Ordeshook 1986; Coughlin and Hinich 1984). Thus, 
the idea of a spatial preference allows us to analyze processes in which people can simultaneously be 
consumers and voters (c.f., Klevorick and Kramer 1973; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Romer·and 
Rosenthal 1979), and it thereby moves us closer to the goal of integrating the analysis of political and 
economic institutions. 
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The Median Voter Theorem: Aside from Condorcet's paradox, perhaps no result captured as much 
attention as Black's Median Voter Theorem, especially after Downs breathed substantive life into it. 
The theorem, which illuminates the strong centralizing tendency of simple majority rule electoral 
institutions, is perhaps intuitive and obvious -- especially to politicians whose livelihoods depend on 
understanding the basic forces of the political system with which they must deal. However, people 
have been designing and overturning political institutions for millennia, and we should not be 
surprised to find that a great deal of what we learn about them through game theory, axiomatic 
analysis, or the application of new empirical methodologies merely reconfirms or restates ideas that 
are otherwise obvious or well understood. The fundamental contribution of theoretical inquiry is not 
always the production of the counter-intuitive result -- rather, it is the expanded ability to relate 
seemingly diverse phenomena via a unitary deductive structure. 
The median voter theorem was the first small step towards understanding a variety of phenomena 
using such a structure. First, in exploring this idea's generality, we establish a venue for bringing 
mathematical argument to politics, for injecting game-theoretic reasoning into our discourse in a 
serious way, and for developing a standard whereby we can descriptively and normatively evaluate 
the performance of alternative political institutions. Second, that model plays the same role in 
political theory as does the neoclassical model of markets. Although few empirical examples of 
markets match the mathematics that introductory economics texts describe, the neoclassical model of 
perfectly competitive markets has served as a focus for most of the theoretical advances in economics 
this past forty or so years. Treatment of externalities and public goods, the initial development of 
the rational expectations hypothesis, and the incorporation of game-theoretic reasoning, for example, 
all occurred under the impetus of generalizing and extending that model. 
Following a similar path of development, early variants of election models abstracted greatly from 
reality with assumptions about perfectly informed voters and candidates, 2-candidate competition, 
and perfect spatial mobility. But political scientists have extended that model so that today it 
accommodates a diverse array of considerations such as multidimensional issue spaces, voters who are 
imperfectly informed about candidates, candidates who manipulate the uncertainty of their platforms, 
and voters who choose retrospectively rather than prospectively. Although most spatial analyses focus 
on a 2-candidate scenario, the spatial model has been used to show how political parties can protect 
themselves from third-party entry either by nominating candidates that deviate from the median 
preference (Brams and Straffin 1982; Palfrey 1984, Shepsle and Cohen 1990) or, appealing t.o some 
recent research that has formalized Duverger's (1954) hypothesis that simple majority rule fosters the 
development of a 2-party system (Cox ! 987b, Palfrey 1989; Feddersen, Sened, and Wright 1990), by 
manipulating election procedures so that they more closely match simple majority rule (Bartholdi et 
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al 1990). And paralleling the economist's research into the sources of market failure and the 
development of the idea of rational expectations, we know that the median voter theorem is robust 
to some weakening of the assumption of complete information. Thus, we can assert with greater 
confidence than our intellectual predecessors that democratic institutions do not necessarily operate 
imperfectly in less than ideal circumstances (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985, Austen-Smith and Banks 
1988, Banks 1990, Ledyard 1989). 
We learned early, of course, that the median voter theorem is not robust to the dimensionality of 
the policy space, and this fact generated nearly as much turmoil as constructive research. Political 
theorists became mesmerized by the fact that even the slightest perturbation in preferences away from 
perfect symmetry destroyed the existence of a Condorcet winner, and McKelvey's (1976, 1979) and 
Schofield's (1978) results convinced some researchers of the inherent unpredictability of political 
outcomes (but see Coleman and Ferejohn 1976). Indeed, at least one prominent contributor to 
contemporary political theory came perilously close to asserting that the instability of majority rule 
precluded a science of politics (Riker 1980). 
At approximately the same time, however, we saw the emergence of alternative or more general 
hypotheses about equilibria and candidate platforms, such as the uncovered set (Miller 1980). Thus, 
we now know that if people vote deterministically, the domain of undominated spatial strategies is 
limited to a subset of the policy space with an identifiable structure that can be viewed as a 
generalization of a multi-dimensional median, and that even without a multidimensional median, 
candidates will not wander far from the "center" of the policy space (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1976; 
McKelvey 1986). Moreover, although voting cycles may be unavoidable, specific institutional 
structures and election processes can greatly limit the set of outcomes. that can be realized (c.f., 
Kramer 1977). 
2. Committees 
Mass elections are not the only venue for applying the spatial preference structure. Indeed, Black 
and Newing's early monograph, as well as Black's subsequent presentation of the median voter 
theorem assume that the same model of preferences applies to committees as to electorates, and thus 
both volumes are seminal with respect to the contemporary study of legislatures, committees, and the 
integration of models of political institutions. 
Issue-by-Issue Voting: Of the several extensions of Black and Newing, perhaps none is more 
important that Kramer's (1972) analysis of issue-by-issue voting. Begun initially as a search for 
variants of majority rule that would guarantees stability in an otherwise unstable environment, 
Kramer incorporated Farquharson's perspectives and formalized Black and Newing's spatial analysis 
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of committees so as to offer a set of theorems about sophisticated voting showing that the existence 
of a stable point under issue-by-issue voting depends critically on the assumption that preferences 
on the issues are separable. Although oftentimes ignored or misrepresented (but see Denzau and 
Mackey 1981, Enelow and Hinich 1983, and Epple and Kadane 1990 for a correct interpretation), this 
result is profoundly important. Specifically, owing to the evident restrictiveness of the separability 
assumption, we can infer that procedural details such as dividing the question or assigning substantive 
jurisdictions to subcommittee need not resolve the instabilities inherent in simple majority rule 
processes unless voters are naive or stupid. 
This is not to say, however, that Kramer's analysis establishes the irrelevance of institutions and 
committee procedures, because it is also true that issue-by-issue voting occasions a stable point with 
strategically sophisticated voters in the special case of separable preferences. Thus, Kramer enriches 
our understanding of institutions and procedures by showing that their performance depends not only 
on their character, but also on the structure of preferences and the sophistication of decision makers. 
That is, we cannot appeal, as early 20th century institutionalist were want to do, to mere descriptions 
of institutions, however carefully crafted, to infer final outcomes; nor can we look, as naive 
behavioralists, only at the structure of preferences. Instead, we must look at all factors simultaneously 
before definitive conclusions can be uttered, and in this way, we have moved closer to achieving a 
truly causal explanation of political outcomes. 
More generally, by refocusing attention on procedural details, we have not only gained a deeper 
appreciation of the role of those details in facilitating stability (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 
1981; Riker 1983, Hammond and Miller 1987, 1989), but we have also begun to understand how 
institutions mediate the perceptions and beliefs that the behavioralist seeks to measure. At the same 
time, we have also learned how to identify circumstances under which institutional structures make 
little difference in the final determination of outcomes or least to appreciate the limits of their 
influence on outcomes. We now know, for example, that final outcomes in 2-candidate elections are 
constrained to the same subset of the policy space as are the outcomes that are predicted (via the V­
solution, bargaining set, or competitive solution) to arise in simple majority rule committees 
(McKelvey 1986). 
This fact is profoundly important for democratic theory. Specifically, we are no longer required 
to rationalize the use of elections solely on the basis of simple majoritarian principles or vague appeals 
to legitimacy. In addition, we now have a well founded theoretical basis for viewing 2-party, mass 
elections as a reasonable substitute for the ideal of democracy, the "New England Town Meeting," 
whenever the number of potential participants in such a meeting is too great. 
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Agendas: Aside from establishing some results about a particular procedural detail, Black and 
Newing showed how the spatial model can be applied usefully to a wide range of political institutions, 
and the research that followed contributed to a clearer understanding of the influences of various 
rules and institutional structures in legislatures (Cain 1978; Denzau and Mackay 1983; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1984), of the historical trends in the ideological basis of American politics (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1985, 1991 ), and of coalition formation in parliaments (Rosenthal 1970; Ordeshook and 
Winer 1980). 
But in addition to learning that "institutions matter," we also gained a deeper appreciation for how 
specific procedural details might be manipulated to influence outcomes. Research on voting agendas 
provides the best example. Farguharson's familiar discussion of the example of Pliney the Younger 
reveals that students of politics have long been acquainted with the opportunity to manipulate 
outcomes by manipulating the ways in which voting and majority rule are implemented in 
committees. And Levine and Plott's (1977, 1978) study of a Southern California flying club also 
convinced us in contemporary terms of the importance of agendas. 
The particular difficulty with such examples, however, matches that of determining the 
consequences of electoral disequilibrium Although we know that people can manipulate outcomes 
by manipulating agendas, this fact alone does not allow us to measure an agenda setter's power. But 
as with election models, the spatial model provides the structure we require to evaluate that power. 
The seminal essay here is McKelvey's (1976, 1979) proof that if there is no Condorcet winner, cycles 
encompass the entire issue space. Although this result has mistakenly been interpreted (not by 
McKelvey) to mean that an agenda setter's power is absolute and that majority rule processes in 
general are chaotic, McKelvey's analysis inaugurated a research agenda that sought to describe the 
influence of agendas and the potential power of a setter. The critical contribution in this instance is 
Miller's (1980) formulation of the uncovered set and his proof that, with strategic voters, amendment 
agendas cannot produce outcomes that are covered by any outcome on the agenda. Shepsle and 
Weingast's (1984) subsequent extension of Miller's analysis to spatial preferences, then, moves us 
closer to completing a research agenda that parallels the one set for 2-candidate elections -­
determining the range of outcomes that can arise in committees that use some type of agenda to give 
order and coherence to their deliberations (see also Ferejohn, McKelvey, and Packet 1984 for a 
different institutional analysis that nevertheless yields an equivalent conclusion -- namely that even 
if cycles are ubiquitous, final outcomes have a limited domain). 
A number of subsidiary results followed quickly from this research. In particular, Ordeshook and 
Schwartz (I 987) noted that, except for those instances in which only three motions (including the 
status quo) are considered, Congressional agendas do not correspond necessarily to amendment 
agendas and that an agenda setter's power is increased considerably if we allow him the full range of 
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agendas that might be formed. On the other hand, Austen-Smith (1987) modeled a particular 
endogenous agenda formation process and gave us reasons for supposing that members of Congress 
can construct amendment agendas so as to secure the outcomes they want while simultaneously voting 
sincerely, and Banks (1989) shows how earlier results can be extended to one type of agenda, the 2-
stage agenda, that can arise in Congress. 
Admittedly, though, this research has two weaknesses. First, it assumes complete information on 
the part of all participants, whereas Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988) give examples of how incomplete 
information can upset even the most basic conclusions -- namely, that sophistication and binary 
agendas are sufficient to produce Condorcet winners as final outcomes -- and how events such as 
non-binding straw polls that precede the implementation of an agenda can influence outcomes. As 
with previous research, however, Ordeshook and Palfrey present only a possibility result by way of 
example, whereas Jung (1989) shows how these conclusions about the impact of informational 
asymmetries -- especially those concerning the ability of agendas to produce Condorcet winners -­
must be modified if we once again supply preferences and outcomes with a simple spatial structure. 
Specifically, if it is common knowledge that all voters have single-peaked preferences, then the 
Condorcet winner once again reappears as the final outcome of any amendment agenda. 
More problematical is the issue of endogenous agendas. Although Banks and Gasmi (1987) 
provide a partial handle on this matter in a spatial context, we can also infer from their analysis that 
studying the processes whereby agendas arise in "large" committees (i.e., n > 3) will pose severe 
analytic difficulties. The general difficulty, of course, is that the processes whereby agendas are 
formed in committees are not well-defined in the sense that those processes do not correspond to any 
self-evident game form. Thus, models like Austen-Smith's (1987) are driven more by the demands 
of tractable analysis than they are by the substantive context of choice. At present, then, there is no 
successful model of endogenous agenda formation that allows for any meaningful interpretation of 
events. 
The particular problem is that to apply game theory usefully so that we can derive more than the 
most general conclusions (e.g., possibility or impossibility results) requires that we provide a game­
form that specifies precisely the identity of decision makers, the sequence with which they make 
decisions, and the information at their disposal when they act. And although agenda voting, like 
simple descriptions of elections, lends itself readily to the construction of such a form, the processes 
whereby agendas are formed is far less structured and, thereby, less amenable to unambiguous game­
theoretic analysis. Thus, before we can achieve meaningful results about endogenous agenda 
processes, greater attention must be paid to the real-world processes that characterize their 
construction. 
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Despite these limitations, we have learned a great deal about agendas, including that they cannot 
lead anywhere if voters are sophisticated, that final outcomes are sensitive to information structure, 
and, perhaps most importantly, that even with sophisticated voters, agenda voting confers 
considerable power on those who design them or who otherwise control their construction. Thus, 
although many things must be measured and understood before we can predict outcomes, we have 
learned the factors that mediate the influence of procedures as well as how those factors combine. 
And, in addition, we have learned and can now formally document something that was self-evident 
to the Founders of the American republic -- namely, that no only does the broad character of 
institutions matter, but so do procedural details, and that gaining control of those details is often the 
critical political event. 
3. Game Theory 
The literature on 2-candidate elections and agendas reveals not only the extent of game theory's
impact in political science, but it reveals also the increasing sophistication with which political 
scientists make use of that theory. With the exceptions of spatial election models, which relied on 
zero-sum games, Riker's development of the size principle, and Kramer's analysis of issue-by-issue 
voting, the application of game theory throughout the l 960's and most of the ?O's consisted for the 
most part of simple stories about and adaptations of 2X2 games -- if a political process did not 
correspond to a Prisoners' Dilemma, then it must have been a Game of Chicken or a Battle of the 
Sexes, and if a coalitional process could not be analyzed using some descriptively meaningless "power 
index," then a simple majority game with transferable utility was assumed to apply. These analyses 
illustrated and illuminated the forces that are common to a wide range of political phenomena, but 
they are little more than examples to be appended to more serious empirical research. 
The more sophisticated applications of game theory began in two areas. And unsurprisingly, one 
of these areas pertained to spatial games while the other concerned the analysis of voting procedures. 
In the first area, McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer (1978) observed that, although much of the 
profession was transfixed by the generic instability of majority rule, it had been evident to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern ( 1945) that such instability characterized nearly all cooperative processes. 
But rather than conclude that generic instability implied "chaos," they instead provided a solution 
hypothesis -- the V-set -- to deal with such matters. Unfortunately, the application of these ideas 
to spatial majority rule games revealed their general inadequacy -- they either made no pre.diction
at all or they made predictions that were patently silly. Consequently, McKelvey, Ordeshook, and 
Winer developed the Competitive Solution, and applied it to the study of parliamentary coalitions and 
to Congressional vote trading (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1980, Ordeshook and Winer 1980). At about 
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the same time, Schofield ( l 980, 1982) developed various extensions of solution theory that also treated 
parliamentary coalitions. Neither the competitive solution nor Schofield's extensions have proven to 
be wholly satisfactory, and research in this area languished as people became concerned with the 
endogenous sources of cooperation and with the "Nash agenda" for studying cooperation. 
Nevertheless, research has continued, even though a wholly satisfactory cooperative solution 
hypothesis has not yet appeared (cf. Bennett and Zamir 1988; Sharkey 1990, Greenberg 1991). 
The second venue for the more sophisticated application of game theory concerned agendas, which 
began with McKelvey and Niemi's (1978) and�Moulin's (1979) demonstration of the correspondence 
between the analysis of sophisticated voting and subgame perfection and their subsidiary results about 
agenda outcomes. These essays, of course, are the immediate predecessors of the research on agendas 
reviewed in the previous section. 
Today the applications of game theory to politics encompass nearly all areas and all forms of 
analysis. In addition to the applications to elections cited previously, the technology of incomplete 
information games has allowed us to extend and generalize Schelling's (1960) treatment of threats and 
deception and has thereby revolutionized the analysis of strategic deterrence in international affairs 
(c.f., O'Neill 1989a,b, Powell 1990, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1991, Kilgore and Zagare 1991). 
Similarly, recursive games have been applied to formulate hypotheses about the sources of seniority 
rule in Congress (McKelvey and Riesmann 1991) and the nature of Congressional redistributive 
politics (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). The concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (Maynard Smith 
1982) is slowly creeping into our research, and promises to offer a better understanding of 
equilibrium selection and the evolution of institutions. And applications of repeated games have 
advanced from Taylor's (1976, 1987) and Axelrod's (1984) treatments. of the repeated Prisoners' 
Dilemma to more general analyses of cooperation in politics (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987; Calvert 
1989; Bianco and Bates 1990). Indeed, political scientists have been nearly as quick as their colleagues 
in economics to realize that contemporary developments in game theory allow them to theorize about 
the fundamental question of institutions -- namely, how those institutions emerge and are maintained 
in otherwise anarchic systems. 
Game theoretic reasoning has also escaped the boundaries set by the topics of war, elections, and 
committees. The application of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is no longer relegated to simple 
stories about the sources of cooperation, but are used instead to model, for example, the endogenous 
development of institutions to accommodate the provision of public goods and the management of 
common property resources (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom and Walker 1991 ), and in at least one instance 
games of incomplete information have been applied to study the consequences of alternative forms 
and levels of punishment on criminal behavior (Cox 1991 ). Thus, in addition to facilitating the 
analysis of existing institutions, we are now beginning to see game theory applied to their design. 
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Attention to the "Nash agenda" with respect to cooperation has also led to some initial success at 
addressing a classic problem of political theory -- the sources of cooperation and stability in anarchic 
international affairs. We have previously noted Morgenthau's (1948) general acceptance of the 
rationality postulate. But without the tools of contemporary theory -- game theory in particular -­
students of international politics had to contend with a confusing array of concepts and definitions 
such as those of "alliance," "collective security,11 "power," 11stability," and "balance of power," and they 
seemed unable to achieve the fundamental objective of international political theory -- determining 
the sources of stability in anarchic systems and the viability of alternative prescriptions for foreign 
policy. 
Admittedly, with the exception of recent research in deterrence and the applications of various 
2X2 games, the development of international relations theory has lagged behind the study of elections 
and committees. This lag is due, doubtlessly, to the fact that structural character of various 
committees and election processes is well defined -- or at least better defined than that of 
international politics. (Indeed, as we have already noted, when dealing with ill-defined committee 
processes such as endogenous agenda formation, our advances are no more striking than those we 
attribute to international relations theorists.) Wagner (1986), however, pointed the way towards the 
application of recursive games, and Niou and Ordeshook (1990, 199l a,b), building on Wagner's 
framework, have established that a balance of power (corresponding to an equilibrium of stationary 
strategies) and collective security (corresponding to an equilibrium of simple punishment strategies) 
can simultaneously exist in an otherwise anarchic system, and that alliances the correspond to limited 
collective security arrangements can survive as well. 
Game theory, then, is at the core of contemporary political theory in nearly every subfield, and 
those who wish to remain on the frontiers of research must grasp new concepts and results as they 
appear in specialized journals. It is also interesting to note that as the sophistication of applications 
increases, reliance on the spatial preference structure diminishes. None of the research on deterrence 
or on the sources of stability in international systems is impaired by the failure to adapt to such a 
structure. The explanation, we suspect, is that although that structure was necessary so that political 
scientists could escape from simplistic 2X2 game-theoretic stories, the present level of sophistication 
allows for more varied assumptions about preference and for models that better treat less formal 
processes. 
But it is also important to ask: Are the components of this research anything more than a 
forgettable series of essays analyzing models that the demands of tractability render irrelevant to the 
real world? This question has two answers. First, in addition to facilitating the integration of 
political and economic models and the study of institutions, contemporary theory offers a fresh 
perspective on the study of political actors. Outside of the traditions of formal analysis, different 
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types of political actors, as well as the institutions in which they operate, are frequently treated in 
isolation and without full regard for the strategic complexity of their environments. If other decision 
makers are relevant to the actions of those under investigation, then their motives are largely treated 
as exogenous to the analysis and their actions are treated as contingent in some simple way on the 
actions of the class of decision makers under investigation. Thus, voters are studied in contexts in 
which the strategic responses of candidates and parties are ignored in favor of understanding the 
sociological and psychological determinants of attitudes and the influence of attitudes on party or 
candidate choice. Legislators, although assumed to be primarily interested in maximizing their 
chances of reelection, are assumed to act in an environment in which voters and interest groups either 
approve or disapprove of their actions or in which bureaucrats either shirk or respond to congressional 
initiatives. Similarly, in evaluating, say, a particular election reform, it is not uncommon to see past 
voting data "plugged into" an alternative procedure for tabulating votes in order to "see what would 
have happened had this procedure been in effect," despite the fact that that behavior as well as the 
behavior of other relevant decision makers (e.g., candidates) might have been influenced by a change 
in procedures. 
In contrast, owing to its reliance on game theory, contemporary theory requires a full strategic 
view in which, given the institutional context of choice, candidates and voters choose best responses 
to each others' strategies, and in which the actions of constituents, legislators, and government 
bureaucrats are simultaneously viewed as maximizing their objectives under the assumption that all 
other actors are seeking to do the same thing. 
4. Science versus Engineering 
However, critics of this theory can point to the fact that few if any persons pursue this general 
equilibrium research agenda -- presumably because constructing models in which all relevant decision 
makers act strategically yields an unwieldy analysis and does not engender generalizable analytic 
results. The literature does not offer a spatial elections model, for example, that simultaneously 
accommodates the strategic decisions of voters, candidates, party leaders, and campaign contributors, 
operating under complex but realistic elections rules, while simultaneously taking into account the 
fact that the election will be followed by a period of legislative-executive interaction, which will be 
followed by another election, and so on. 
However, continued calls for greater scope, generality, and relaxation of assumptions ignores the 
important difference between the scientific enterprise of uncovering fundamental forces that operate 
universally and the engineering enterprise of using the lessons of theory to model actual or proposed 
political-economic institutions and processes. 
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To illustrate what we mean by this distinction, consider the ostensible contributions of spatial 
models of elections. At a minimum, those contributions include: (1) demonstrating the profound 
difference between uni- and multi-dimensional election contests (Downs versus Plott and Davis and 
Hinich); (2) demonstrating the possibility of placing bounds on the strategies that candidates adopt 
in multidimensional 2-candidate contests (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1976; McKelvey 1986); (3) 
establishing the possibility of complete information revelation in incomplete information elections 
(McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985, Ledyard 1989); ( 4) developing statistical procedures for measuring 
spatial preferences and candidate locations, and for determining how voters map their concerns into 
a general policy space (Enelow and Hinich 1984); (5) ascertaining the theoretical basis of Duverger's 
hypothesis (Cox I 987b; Palfrey 1989; Fedderson, Sened, and Wright 1990); (6) showing how the spatial 
analysis of 2-candidate elections can be extended to multi-candidate contests and to the analysis of 
alternative voting institutions (Cox 1987a, 1990; Greenberg and Weber 1985); and (7) showing how 
probabilistic voting can "smooth" candidate responses and generate stability (Hinich, Ledyard, and 
Ordeshook 19xx; Coughlin 1984); and (8) showing that even if all of the other assumptions of the 
median voter theorem are satisfied, probabilistic voting can yield outcomes other than the median 
(Hinich 1977). 
By themselves, however, these conclusions do not constitute a complete model of any election, nor 
do they appear to provide much useful practical advice about, say, democratic reform in Eastern 
Europe or elsewhere. To see this, consider the following problem: Under the authoritarian control 
of the KMT since 1949, Taiwan (the Republic of China) seeks to democratize, which includes the 
forced retirement of the permanent mainland members of the Yuan elected in 1948. This 
commitment to reform occasions a series of design issues such as determining whether representatives 
should be elected in single or multiple member districts, and, if multiple member, whether districts 
should be large or small and whether a single non-transferable vote scheme should be implemented. 
A related issue concerns the selection of chief executive and choosing between a presidential direct 
election system and a parliamentary system. The specific concern here is ascertaining the 
consequences of alternative reforms for political stability, party factionalism, and relative KMT 
influence, as well as determining the impact of these alternatives on the relative political power of 
native Taiwanese versus mainlanders. 
This is not an unimportant design issue, at least for the residents of Taiwan. However, merely 
being told about the centralizing tendency of two-candidate plurality rule elections or the fact that 
multi-dimensionality can occasion disequilibrium is unlikely to win many converts in Taiwan to a 
more theoretical perspective. We can say that multi-member districts induce party factionalism (Cox 
1990) -- a fact already widely understood on the basis of Japan's experience -- or that bicameralism 
facilitates stability (Hammond and Miller 1990), but there are only a few attempts at understanding 
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the relationship between electoral and parliamentary processes (Rosenthal 1970, Austen Smith and 
Banks 1990), and we have made almost no progress at all in determining the implications for minority 
rights of alternative electoral systems except in the most abstract way. Indeed, despite thirty years 
of modelling efforts, we know relatively little about multi-party electoral competition (cf. Shepsle and 
Cohen 1 990; Cox 1990; and Shepsle 1990 for a review) and competition in those electoral systems that 
more generally characterize reality. 
The realization of the shortcomings of contemporary theory can produce at least two responses. 
On the one hand, we can continue on the path of incrementally exploring alternative models that are 
driven largely by the availability of new analytic technologies and the demands of tractability - ­
arguing forcefully with our more substantively oriented colleagues that the construction of theory is 
an incremental process that requires patience. Doubtlessly, in a hundred years or so we might have 
something more specific to report to the residents of Taiwan -- although there is a reasonably good 
chance that we will also only confront at that time a set of abstract theorems detailing the 
impossibility of stable political systems and the intractability of the concept of minority rights. 
Moreover, our current inability to "derive" effective economic reform policies for the faltering 
economies of Eastern Europe and the USSR using any part of the hundreds of essays appearing in 
Econometrica or JET, despite their advanced mathematical development, should diminish our 
confidence in the argument for patience. 
On the other hand, we might try to respond to critics by constructing wholly integrated models 
that add as many features of reality as possible, including simultaneous assessments of elections and 
legislative actions along with a consideration of the macro-economic forces that impinge on the 
performance of elections and legislatures. The difficulty here, however, is that such models are 
unlikely to yield the sort of punchy analytic results that guarantee success in the ultimate objective 
of lengthening our vitae. And should such results be sought, the necessity for maintaining rigor and 
tractability would require compromises of Herculean proportions. 
There is, however, a third response which derives from the fact that the construction of models 
informed by theory is not impossible. Specifically, existing theory tells us to be concerned about issue 
dimensionality, but it also tells us that it is unnecessary to presuppose that a simple equilibrium 
prevails before useful predictions can be uttered. We should also be aware of the possibility that 
voters and candidates will gather information about relevant parameters in indirect ways, and we 
should consider the fact that voters, politicians and interest groups will respond strategically to 
electoral procedures in such a way that parties may splinter or recombine in different ways. 
Naturally, in constructing any model of an existing or a proposed electoral system, we must take 
careful measurements of preferences and perceptions, with the understanding that the general 
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character of competition will be molded by the underlying structure of preferences and the ways in 
which voters combine substantive issues in order to produce a coherent spatial map for themselves. 
Naturally, in fitting these pieces together, we cannot anticipate a model that will generate readily 
interpretable analytic results, and we may be able to determine outcomes only through such 
techniques as laboratory experimentation and computer simulation. However, just as the engineer 
does not attempt to derive theorems about bridge design or to establish equations in closed analytic 
form about the point at which fluid flowing through a pipe changes from laminar to turbulent flow, 
we should not anticipate theorems here. 
Our argument is that political analysis ought to consist of two enterprises. First, it ought to be 
concerned with uncovering basic laws and forces. For the Founders of the American republic, those 
laws took the form of ideas about the permanence of faction, the necessity for a tripartite balance of 
forces, the inhibiting influence of a bicameral legislature, and the fact that institutions can regulate 
but cannot eliminate the forces of self-interest. To these ideas contemporary political theory adds 
the median voter theorem, results about stability and instability in complex issue arenas, Duverger's 
hypothesis about simple plurality rule, the possibility of rational expectations, the strategic character 
of vote trading in legislatures, theorems about the influence of agendas and other procedures on final 
outcomes, and a fuller understanding of the sources of cooperation. 
In uncovering those basic laws, the political theorist should, of course, seek as much generality 
as possible. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite's (1975) manipulability result, McKelvey and 
Schofield's (1988) research into the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of cores, and 
Miller's (1980) development of the uncovered set illustrate this enterprise. Alternatively, the theorist 
can attempt to formulate models that, although not general, reveal the relevance of factors hitherto 
ignored. Plott (1967) and Davis and Hinich's (1967) proof of the relevance of issue dimensionality, 
Kramer's (1972) analysis of issue-by-issue voting, McKelvey and Ordeshook's (1985) demonstration 
of the possibility of rational expectations in elections, Brams's (1976) cataloging of paradoxes in 
politics, and Wagner's (1986) demonstration of the possibility of stability in an otherwise anarchic 
international system are examples of this avenue of investigation. 
The second enterprise -- political engineering -- is unfortunately only weakly, if at all, 
represented in contemporary political theory. That such an approach is required if political science 
is to be an applied science is made evident by the fact that even after four decades of research into 
social choice and voting institutions, practitioners in the field do not agree even among themselves 
about the ultimate implications of their research. Riker (1983) and Coleman and Ferejohn (1986), 
for example, disagree over whether contemporary social choice theory and, in particular, the "chaos" 
theorems of McKelvey and Schofield imply anything about the relative value and stability of populist 
versus liberal democracy. Similarly, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984) and Shepsle and Weingast 
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( I  984) disagree over whether the "new institutionalism" in fact offers anything new other than the 
proposition that institutions deflect majority preferences only to the extent that transaction costs are 
high. 
Of course, it may be that our theory is too primitive to contribute to political engineering, but we 
should not shirk from such a role if we can augment our theories with the talents and insights of the 
substantive expert. And even though such activities do not produce theorems of the sort deemed 
necessary for publication in prestigious journals, a serious attempt to meld theory into being a 
practical science is far more valuable than deriving with skill that next cute theorem in the context 
of an otherwise silly model. 
5. Empirical Research
Before we can fully evaluate the opportunities and requirements for political engineering, though, 
we should first evaluate the empirical applications of political theory. It is certainly true that 
although theoretical advances, both useful and not useful, continue to be made at a fast pace, direct 
empirical applications of theory proceed with considerably greater difficulty. There are far too few 
parallels, for example, to Sawyer and MacRae's ( 1962) analysis of cumulative voting in Illinois, Romer 
and Rosenthal's (1979) study of Oregon referenda, Rosenthal and Sen's (1973, 1977) empirical testing 
of alternative hypotheses about non-voting, Poole and Rosenthal's (1985, 1991) historical study of 
issue cleavages in the U.S. Congress, Enelow and Hinich's (1984) estimation of the correspondence 
between actionable issues and generalized policy spaces, McCubbins and Kiewiet's (1988) analysis of 
presidential vetoes; Cox's ( 1987c) study of political party development in England, Roberts' ( 1990) 
validation of the rational expectations hypothesis in politics (see also Forsythe et al 1991 ), Plott and 
Levine's (1977, 1978), Enelow's (1981) and Enelow and Koehler's (1980) examples of agenda 
manipulation, and Riker's ( 1983, 1984, 1988) applications of social choice theory to macro-historical 
data. 
Each of these studies gives us confidence that the preoccupation of the theorist is something more 
than a pleasant hobby. However, the actual contribution of the majority of empirical research to 
theory is difficult to evaluate, because it is generally difficult to determine its purpose. We are 
amused, for example, by those essays that ostensibly test even today the hypothesis that voters are 
"rational." Is it possible that practitioners in the field are prepared to accept the hypothesis that the 
rationality paradigm is bunkum? Or consider those analyses that "test" models that are grossly false 
a priori. Although we might interpret such research as uncovering some empirical regularity, even 
if we learn that such a model "explains" some data up to an acceptable level of statistical accuracy, 
we would nevertheless be foolhardy to believe that the forces being described are invariant with the 
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assumptions that render the analysis tractable. We might argue that such findings suggest that our 
efforts are "headed in the right direction," but how do we contend with the fact that we can establish 
nearly any reasonable outcome as an equilibrium to a variety of models, provided only that those 
models are sufficiently complex? 
To evaluate contemporary contributions and future directions, then, consider first the proposition 
that such research ought to have one of five objectives: (I ) identifying or otherwise demonstrating 
the existence of empirical generalities that require explanation; (2) testing basic laws and premises; 
(3) demonstrating the universality of some law by way of empirical (historical) example; ( 4) estimating 
a model's parameter values; and (5) testing the design of political mechanisms. 
Nearly all empirical research matches one of these categories, but a considerable portion of that 
research is only poorly designed to accomplished its objective. Nevertheless, examples of research 
that correspond to the first two categories can be found in a growing experimental literature. For 
example, Berl et al's (1976) and Fiorina and Plott's (1978) studies of the core establish this idea as 
more than a mere mathematical invention - - it is a solution hypothesis that is at least as robust to a 
variety of social-psychological variables as any other available idea. Augmenting the Congressional 
studies cited earlier, experimental work by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984); Wilson (1986); Salant 
and Goodstein (1987); Herzberg and Wilson ( 1991 ); and Rapoport et al (1991) gives us confidence that 
theoretical research into the effects of institutions and procedures is not without substantive 
foundation. McKelvey and Ordeshook's (1985) incomplete information election experiments draw 
attention to broader definitions of equilibrium and to the notion of rational expectations. And Miller 
and Oppenheimer's (1982) and Eavey and Miller's (1984) research on fairness, which fits nicely in the 
first category of empirical research, serves as a warning about the existence of motivating factors 
other than a myopic concern with the maximization of wealth and suggests that people consider 
fairness in systematic ways. 
Of course, political scientists will quibble over whether their empirical research matches one of 
the first three categories and whether experimental or field data is best suited for the purpose of 
hypothesis testing. This is due in part to the fact that the notion of a first principle is vague. Such 
a principle can refer to some "micro" idea about, say, how people process information or the validity 
of a specific equilibrium notion, or it can refer to a more "macro" idea, such as the median voter 
theorem or an hypothesis about the sources of governmental growth and inefficiency. However, 
regardless of how we interpret "first principles," little research match the fourth or fifth categories, 
which are the ones that correspond most closely to "political engineering." And in this context it is 
time to consider the approach to empirical "research" taken by those preeminent political engineers, 
the Founders of the American republic. 
21 
First, it is evident that they proceeded in much the same way as theorists operate today in that 
they "relied mainly on deducing descriptive and prescriptive truths ... from First Principles ... 
Historical and contemporary experience were considered not the sole source of truth but merely a 
quarry from which illustrations could be mined to clarify and lend persuasive force to the truths 
revealed by Right Reason from First Principles" (Ranney 1976:144). But as the debate between 
Schwartz ( 1989) and Cain and Jones ( 1989) suggests, the Founders were also experimentalists in that 
they understood that neither historical experience nor deductive logic could definitively answer all 
practical design issues. 
Barring the tools of laboratory experimentation or econometrics, they struck upon an imaginative 
approach -- designing a political system that would not only be an experiment, but also an experiment 
capable of self-correction as seemed warranted by the data. Even though they understood fully the 
importance of institutions, they designed a constitution that was itself open-ended and capable of 
revision in light of experience. And rather than proscribe specific procedures for the branch of 
government they regarded as most important -- the Legislative -- they allowed that branch to choose 
its own rules of organization and voting. 
Today, of course, far too little use is made of historical data as a source of new ideas and as a test 
of existing ones. Nevertheless, one of the most encouraging features of contemporary political theory 
is that it appears to be accommodating itself slowly to an engineering-experimental agenda. Ostrom 
and Walker's (1991) research on common pool resource issues, Isaac and Walker's ( 1988) study of 
public goods provision and group size, Boylan, et al's (1991) analysis of the influence of electoral 
mechanisms on government investment, and Plott's (1991) analysis of the influences of polls on 
election results all illustrate research that moves us closer to understanding the behavior of complex 
systems. Far more studies of this sort, however, are required before we can assert that the practical 
value of contemporary political theory has equalled or surpassed the level achieved in 1787. 
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